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JOINDER & SEVERANCE OF OFFENSES 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
This article discusses joinder and severance of offenses. 
An article examining joinder and severance of defendants 
was published in the last issue. See generally 2 Katz & 
Giannelli, Baldwin's Ohio Practice Criminal Law ch. 57 
Summer 1997 
"'" (1996). 
ty of incongruous results in successive trials before different 
juries." State v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St.2d 223, 225, 400 
N.E.2d 401 (1980). See also State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 
340, 421 N.E.2d 1288 (1981); State v. Dunkins, 10 Ohio 
App.3d 72, 460 N.E.2d 688 (1983). 
The importance of joinder cannot be overestimated. As 
one commentator has noted: 
The way in which the prosecutor chooses to combine 
offenses or defendants in a single indictment is per-
haps second in importance only to his decision to pros-
ecute. Whether a defendant is tried en masse with 
many other participants in an alleged crime, or in a 
separate trial of his own, will often be decisive of the 
outcome. Equally decisive may be the number of of-
fenses which are cumulated against a single defen-
dant, particularly if they are unconnected. 8 Moore's 
Federal Practice 8-3 (Cipes ed. 1993). 
Criminal Rule 8(A) covers the joinder of offenses in one . 
indictment, information, or complaint. Rule 13 governs the 
consolidation for trial of offenses where there is more than 
one charging instrument. Finally, Rule 14 governs sever-
ance of offenses. Joinder issues arise under two circum-
stances. The first arises when the defendant argues that 
the joinder of offenses does not satisfy the explicit language 
of Rule 8(A)- i.e., misjoinder. The second arises when 
joinder is proper under Rule 8(A) but is prejudicial to the de-
fendant in some manner. The defendant would then invoke 
Rule 14, which allows the court to bifurcate the offenses into 
separate trials should circumstances warrant. 
UNDERLYING POLICIES 
Joinder of offenses is justified primarily for reasons of 
administrative efficiency. The law favors joinder and the 
avoidance of multiple trials. See State v. Richey, 64 Ohio 
St.3d 353, 365, 595 N.E.2d 915 (1992), cert. denied, 507 
U.S. 989 (1993); State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163, 555 
N.E.2d 293 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1017 (1990). 
"Joinder conserves judicial and prosecutorial time, lessens 
the not inconsiderable expenses of multiple trials, diminish-
es inconvenience to witnesses, and minimizes the possibili-
Under some circumstances, joinder of offenses may ac-
crue to a defendant's advantage. As two commentators 
have pointed out: "Being called upon to defend himself in a 
number of trials may be harassing to a defendant and be a 
disadvantage far outweighing the prejudice which may re-
sult from a joinder. It is possible for the prosecutor to with-
hold some of the charges and file them as detainers, thus 
making it difficult for defendant to get parole." Remington & 
Joseph, Charging, Convicting, and Sentencing the Multiple 
Criminal Offender, 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 528, 538-39. 
Joinder can, however, also be prejudicial to defendants. 
Evidence of guilt-of one offense may lead a jury to convict 
on a joined offense, which might have resulted in acquittal 
had there been separate trials. 
JOINDER OF OFFENSES: RULE S(A} 
Rule 8(A) provides that two or more offenses may be 
charged together in one indictment, information, or com-
plaint if the offenses (1) are of the same or similar character, 
(2) are based on the same act or transaction, (3) are based 
on two or more acts or transactions constituting parts of a 
common scheme or plan, or (4) are part of a course of crim-
inal conduct. See State v. Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 524 
N.E.2d 476 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 975 (1988). 
Moreover, felonies and misdemeanors may be joined in one 
charging instrument. See State v. Hammer, 82 Ohio App.3d 
663, 612 N.E.2d 1300 (1992); Becker v. State, 39 Ohio App. 
496, 177 N.E. 605 (1930). 
Examples of offenses that may properly be joined include 
charges of: 
(1) aggravated burglary with a different case involving 
aggravated murder and aggravated burglary, State v. 
Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 580 N.E.2d 1 (1991 ), cert. de-
nied, 504 U.S. 960 (1992); 
(2) breaking & entering and larceny, Carter v. Maxwell, 
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177 Ohio St. 35, 201 N.E.2d 705 (1964); 
(3) forgery and uttering a forged instrument, State v. 
Atkinson, 4 Ohio St.2d 19, 211 N.E.2d 665 (1965); 
(4) aggravated burglary and theft, State v. Durham, 49 
Ohio App.2d 231, 233, 360 N.E.2d 743 (1976) (both offens-
es based on the same act or transaction); 
(5) armed robbery stemming from separate and distinct 
incidents, State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 582 N.E.2d 972 
(1992), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1227 (1992); and 
(6) breaking & entering and arson, State v. Richey, 64 
Ohio St.3d 353, 365, 595 N.E.2d 915 (1992), cert. denied, 
507 u.s. 989 (1993). 
The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 
160,555 N.E.2d 293 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1017 
(1990), upheld the joinder of 1983 aggravated burglary and 
petty theft charges with 1986 aggravated murder, robbery, 
burglary, arson, and kidnapping charges involving the same 
victim and house. 
Limitations 
While Criminal Rule S(A) appears by its broad language 
to permit joinder of a wide range of offenses, courts have 
established limits on the nature of crimes that may be 
joined. For example, in Ohio, offenses connected only in 
the "discovery" of their commission may not be joined. In 
State v. Atkinson, 4 Ohio St.2d 19, 211 N.E.2d 665 (1965), 
the indictment contained counts of (1) forging a check, (2) 
uttering a forged instrument, and (3) carrying a concealed 
. weapon. The weapon had been found during a search for 
the forged documents, and the Ohio Supreme Court held 
that the concealed weapon charge was improperly joined 
since its only relationship with the forgery charges was their 
common discovery. Some federal decisions reach the op-
posite result. While the federal counterpart to Criminal Rule 
S(A) is nearly identical, a federal court has found that the 
discovery nexus for joinder, which Ohio has rejected, is a 
proper justification for joinder. In United States v. Pietras, 
501 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1071 
(1974), an unregistered gun was discovered in a search of a 
getaway van used for a robbery and kidnapping. Although 
the gun was not used in those activities, the Eighth Circuit 
upheld the joinder of the gun charge. See also United 
States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding drugs 
and gun in a search was a sufficient nexus). 
MULTIPLE INDICTMENTS & COMPLAINTS: RULE 13 
Criminal Rule 13 governs joinder where there is more 
than one charging instrument. Here, again, the law favors 
joinder for policy reasons. There are times that the defen-
dant may want to consolidate charges for one trial. If the 
prosecutor obtains separate indictments in order to try a de-
fendant several times for related offenses, the defendant 
may move to consolidate under Rule 13. 
At other times, however, a defendant may not want unre-
lated offenses joined for trial. In State v. Clements, 98 Ohio 
App.3d 797, 649 N.E.2d 912 (1994), the defendant was in-
dicted for burglary and on a later date for aggravated rob-
bery with a firearms specification. The court of appeals 
ruled that the defendant was denied a fair trial when the trial 
court denied a defense motion objecting to the joinder of 
those charges where the offenses occurred at different 
times and locations, involved different victims, different wit-
nesses, and different evidence. 
2 
Multiple Charges for One Offense 
Occasionally, a prosecutor may attempt to charge a de-
fendant for one offense in multiple indictments or in multiple 
counts in the same indictment. Under Criminal Rule 14, the 
court may require the prosecutor to elect which indictment 
to proceed upon where the offenses charged arise out of a 
single act. But election is not required under Criminal Rule 
13 if the offenses could properly have been joined in a sin-
gle indictment or complaint. 
While this appears clear, some statutes may not specify 
whether they cover one criminal offense or more than one. 
For example, in State v. Trocodaro, 40 Ohio App.2d 50, 317 
N.E.2d 418 (1973), the defendant was charged under the 
same statute in separate indictments for felony murder and 
premeditated murder arising out of the same act. The court 
found that election was not required because the two of-
fenses are separate and distinct under the "same evidence" 
test even though the offenses are defined in the same 
statute. "'Murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery 
and murder committed with deliberate and premeditated 
malice are not one and the same offense, even though the 
victim is one and the same person."' ld. at 52 (quoting State 
v. Ferguson, 175 Ohio St. 390, 394, 195 N.E.2d 794 
(1964)). 
Also, in Reed v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 356, 1_99 N.E.2d 
737 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 866 (1964), the Supreme 
Court held that robbery and rape committed on the same 
victim within a short span of time are separate and distinct 
crimes and may properly be charged as such in separate in-
dictments or counts. 
SEVERANCE: RULE 14 
If offenses are properly joined under Rule S(A), the de-
fendant may nonetheless seek a severance pursuant to 
Rule 14. Where it appears that either the defendant or the 
state will be prejudiced by joinder of offenses, Rule 14 pro-
vides that "the court shall order an election or separate trial 
of counts ... or provide such other relief as justice re-
quires." 
In Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir. 
1964), the court of appeals outlined how a defendant might 
be prejudiced by the joinder of offenses. 
The argument against joinder is that the defendant 
may be prejudiced for one or more of the following rea-
sons: (1) he may become embarrassed or confounded 
in presenting separate defenses; (2) the jury may use 
the evidence of one of the crimes charged to infer a 
criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from 
which is found his guilt of the other crime or crimes 
charged; or (3) the jury may cumulate the evidence of 
the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if con-
sidered separately, it would not so find. A less tangible 
but perhaps equally persuasive element of prejudice 
may reside in a latent feeling of hostility engendered 
by the charging of several crimes as distinct from only 
one. 
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court in McElroy v. 
United States, 164 U.S. 76, 80 (1896), commented: 
[T]he multiplication of distinct charges has been con-
sidered so objectionable as tending to confound the 
accused in his defense, or to prejudice him as to his 
challenges, in the matter of being held out to be habit-
ually criminal, in the distraction of the attention of the 
jury or otherwise, that it is the settled rule in England 
,, 
and in many of our states, to confine the indictment to 
one distinct offense or restrict the evidence to one 
transaction. 
Prejudice 
( The burden is on the party seeking severance to demon-
. ..trate prejudice. State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 595 
N.E.2d 915 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 989 (1993). "The 
burden of demonstrating prejudice is a difficult one, and the 
ruling of the trial judge will rarely be disturbed on review. 
The defendant must show something more than the fact 
that a separate trial might offer him a better chance of ac-
quittal." State v. Henderson, No. 963, 964, 965 (11th Dist. 
Ct. App., Geauga, 7-23-82) (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 
u.s. 554 (1967)). 
The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Torres, 66 Ohio 
St.2d 340, 343, 42i N.E2d 1288 (i98i), adopted a three-
part test which must be met to show error on the part of the 
trial court in refusing to sever charges. Part one states that 
"[a] defendant claiming error in the trial court's refusal to 
allow separate trials under multiple charges under Criminal 
Rule 14 has the burden of affirmatively showing that his 
rights were prejudiced." Part two requires that the defen-
dant furnish ''the trial court with sufficient information so that 
it can weigh considerations favoring joinder against the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial." Part three requires that "he 
must demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in re-
fusing to separate the charges for trial." A reviewing court 
will reverse the trial court's decision only on a showing of 
abuse of discretion which "connotes more than an error of 
law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unrea-
sonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable." See State v. Adams, 
62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). 
i A defendant demonstrated prejudice in a aggravated 
murder case where the trial court refused to sever a charge 
of abuse of a corpse. Although the victim was the same, 
the crimes occurred four days apart. The court of appeals 
found that the prosecution did not overcome defendant's 
showing of prejudice because the videotape that proved the 
lesser offense would not have been admissible in a sepa-
rate trial for aggravated murder. State v. Van Sickle, 90 
Ohio App.3d 301, 629 N.E.2d 39 (1993) (any limited proba-
tive value that videotape had was outweighed by prejudice 
resulting from its gruesome depiction of body burned be-
yond recognition). 
It is not error for a court to refuse to separate offenses 
arising out of the same conduct where the defendant has 
demanded a jury trial for the more serious offense and has 
not for the less serious offenses. State v. Hammer, 82 Ohio 
App.3d 663, 612 N.E.2d 1300 (1992). 
Federal Rule 
The joinder and severance rules found in the Federal 
Rules are, in many-respects, identical to the Ohio Rules. 
Thus, it is not surprising that federal cases would provide in-
terpretive guidance for issues arising under the Ohio Rules. 
See State v. Owens, 51 Ohio App.2d 132, 145, 366 N. E.2d 
1367, 1375 (1975) ("[T]he construction of Fed. R. Crim. P. 
14 by the federal courts is of help in this case."}. 
There are, however, several important differences be-
:Ween the Ohio and Federal Rules. In State v. Durham, 49 
Ohio App.2d 231, 233, 360 N.E.2d 743 (1976), for example, 
the court emphasized that the decision to grant a severance 
"rests in the sound discretion of the [trial] court" and 
"[u]nless the discretion has been exercised to the manifest 
3 
injury of the accused, there is no error." This statement 
overlooks the explicit language of Rule 14, which specifies 
that once prejudice has been found, ''the court shall order 
an election or separate trial of counts, grant severance of 
defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires." 
In contrast, Federal Rule 14 provides that the court may 
sever in the case of prejudice. The drafters of the Ohio 
Rules clearly made a conscious choice to limit the trial 
court's discretion once prejudice has been established. As 
one court has noted: "[W]hile the federal courts have dis-
cretion in granting severance, our rule provides that if preju-
dice is shown ~the court shall order' severance." State v. 
Owens, 51 OhioApp.2d 132,145,366 N.E.2d 1367 1375 
(1975), I 
. T~e decision to make Rule 14 mandatory rather than per-
miSSive probably resulted from criticism of the federal 
courts' reluctance to grant severance liberally under the fed-
eral rule. See 8 Moore's Federal Practice and Procedure 8-
4 (Cipes ed 1979) ("Rule 14 is available, but such availabili-
ty tends to be more theoretical than real."); 1 Wright, 
Federal Practice and Procedure 305 (1969} ("Given the evi-
dent r~luctance of trial and appellate courts to grant sepa-
rate tnals under Rule 14, a broad interpretation of Rule 8 
means broad joinder, whether or not this is just or fair."}. 
Federal authorities, therefore, cannot be used in an unthink-
ing fashion; the Ohio Rule was designed to overrule some 
of these authorities. 
SEPARATE DEFENSES 
Prejudice under Rule 14 may arise, as illustrated by 
Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1964}, 
where the accused has separate defenses. Cross was 
charged with two counts of robbery. In a joint indictment, 
Cross was charged in count I with robbery of a church rec-
tory.on February 23, 1962 and in count II with robbery of a 
tounst home on May 2, 1962. Prior to trial, the defendant 
moved to sever the two offenses so that he could testify on 
one count only. His testimony on count II was convincing -
that he was a victim and not a cohort of the armed robbers 
who entered the tourist home behind him. His testimony on 
count I was evasive and unconvincing. The denial of his 
motion to sever was held to be reversible error. 
If he testifies on one count, he runs the risk that any 
adverse effects will influence the jury's consideration 
of the other count. Thus he bears the risk on both 
counts, although he may benefit on only one. 
Moreover, a defendant's silence on one count would 
be damaging in the face of this express denial of the 
other. Thus he may be coerced into testifying on the 
count upon which he wished to remain silent. It is not 
necessary to decide whether this invades his constitu-
tional right to remain silent, since we think it constitutes 
prejudice within the meaning of Rule 14. 
To prevail on this ground, however, the defendant must 
make a convincing showing. The defendant must produce 
sufficient information regarding the nature of the testimony 
he wishes to give in the one case and the reasons for not 
wishing to testify in the other to satisfy the court that the 
claim of prejudice is genuine. State v. Roberts, 62 Ohio 
St.2d 170,405 N.E.2d 247 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
879 (1980}. A showing that a defendant would prefer totes-
tify on one count but not on the other count does not 
demonstrate that joinder was prejudicial. State v. Grunden, 
65 OhioApp.3d 777,585 N.E.2d 487 (1989). 
i.: 
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CUMULATION OF EVIDENCE 
[)~fendantsseekiAg severaAce of charges often argue-
that trying the charges together will encourage cumulation 
of evidence by the jury. That is, a jury may not be able to 
distinguish the evidence for each particular charge and will 
tend to apply or accumulate evidence from one count to an-
other count. ''We all know that, if you can pile up a number 
of charges against a man, it is quite often the case that the 
jury will convict, where, if they were listening to the evidence 
on one charge only, they would find it wholly insufficient." 
Maguire, Proposed New Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 23 Ore. L. Rev. 56, 58-59 (1943). 
Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 189 (D.C. Cir. 
1966), exemplifies this point. In reversing the defendant's 
conviction, the court commented: 
The point is that a severance should have been grant-
ed because ... the joinder was prejudicial under Rule 
14 . . . . Here there was not only the danger of the ev-
idence with respect to the two robberies cumulating in 
the jurors' minds tending to prove the defendant guilty 
of each, but the evidence as to one of the robberies 
was so weak as to lead one to question its sufficiency 
to go to the jury. Thus its primary usefulness in this 
trial was to support the Government's case as to the 
robbery which resulted in the murder. 
See also United States v. Carter, 475 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 
1973); State v. Jonas, 363 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Conn. 1975). 
The Ohio Supreme Court addressed this issue in State v. 
Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340,343,421 N.E.2d 1288 (1981), 
where the defendant was tried on two separate indictments 
of selling drugs. The Court found that the evidence as to 
each charge was uncomplicated but noted, "Joinder may be 
prejudicial when the offenses are unrelated and the evi-
dence as to each is very weak." Where the evidence rela-
tive to the various charges is simple, distinct, and uncompli-
cated, however, the jury is believed capable of segregating 
the proof on each charge and obeying trial court instruc-
tions. Thus, any effects of a spill-over between the offenses 
are insubstantial, and any prejudice harmless. State v. 
Roberts, 62 Ohio St.2d 170, 405 N.E.2d 247 (1980), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 879 (1980). 
CHARACTER & BAD ACTS 
Joinder of offenses may have a negative impact on the 
jurors' feelings about the defendant. "Improper joinder may 
not only confuse a jury but may create an unfavorable im-
pression in their minds as to an appellant's character before 
any evidence has been admitted as to his guilt or inno-
cence." State v. Minneker, 27 Ohio St.2d 155, 157-58, 271 
N.E.2d 821 (1971). For example, where a particularly 
heinous or disgusting crime is joined with an offense of an 
entirely different and less offensive character, the prosecu-
tor's opening statement alone might predispose the jurors 
against defendant because of the more heinous charge and 
lead them to find guilt on the unconnected charge. 
Moreover, the possibility that the jury will convict because 
the defendant possesses a criminal disposition is always a 
risk. Shielding the defendant from this possibility underlies 
the rule, long recognized in Ohio, that the state may not in-
troduce evidence of the defendant's bad character or repu-
tation unless the defendant first introduces evidence of his 
good character. See State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 400-
02, 358 N.E.2d 623 (1976), vacated in part, 438 U.S. 910 
(1976); State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E.2d 7 42 
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(1949). Even if character evidence is not introduced, the 
jury may nonetheless infer a bad character or criminal dis-
position because multiple offenses are tried together. 
This risk is especially troublesome when Rule S(A) join-
der is based on crimes "of the same or similar character" ,1 
that are not part of a single scheme or plan. Here, the justi' 
fications for joinder - "avoiding duplicitous, time consuming 
trials in which the same factual and legal issues must be liti-
gated"- are not applicable. ABA Standards Relating to 
Joinder and Severance 29 (1968). "[S]ince the offenses on 
trial are distinct, trial of each is likely to require its own evi-
dence and witnesses. The time spent where similar offens-
es are joined may not be as long as two trials butthe time 
saved by impanelling only one jury and by setting the defen-
dant's background only once seems minimal." Note, Joint 
and Single Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 74 Yale L.J. 553, 560 (1965). 
While the Rule permits joinder of the same or similar of-
fenses, the absence of strong policy reasons for this type of 
joinder should be considered by a court ruling on a motion 
to sever offenses under Rule 14. See ABA Standards 
Relating to Joinder and Severance§ 2.2(a) (1968) (provid-
ing for severance as a matter of right when the same or 
similar offenses are joined). 
Evidence Rule 404(8) 
Severance, however, may not obviate this problem be-
cause even if the offenses are tried separately, the severed 
offenses may be admissible under Evidence Rule 404(B). 
In this event, the defendant would still face the risk that the 
jury would improperly infer criminal disposition. See State v. 
Owens, 51 OhioApp.2d 132,366 N.E.2d 1367 (1975). 
Note, however, that the joinder requirements of Rule 8(A) ·~ 
are broader than the admissibility requirements of Rule 404. 
See 1 Giannelli & Snyder, Baldwin's Ohio Practice Evidence 
§ 404.16 (1996). 
Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964), is a 
leading case on this issue. Drew was convicted of robbery 
and attempted robbery. The robbery occurred at a High's 
Diary store on July 27, 1962. The perpetrator was a male 
with sunglasses who said, ''This is a holdup." When the 
clerk hesitated, the robber brandished a gun. The attempt 
occurred on August 13 at another High's Dairy store. The 
perpetrator was a same-race male wearing sunglasses. He 
told the clerk, "Give me the money." The clerk responded 
by saying "come and get it." The perpetrator repeated the 
demand several times and then said, "You are not going to 
give it." The clerk said, "No." When a customer entered the 
store, the perpetrator fled. Drew was arrested within 25 
minutes and identified. The Court concluded that these of-
fenses would not be admissible as "other crimes" evidence 
because they were not sufficiently similar. Moreover, the 
two incidents were confused. The witness responses 
showed confusion as to which crime counsel referred to and 
the prosecutor "lumped the two together" during summation. 
The Ohio Supreme Court has addressed this issue on 
several occasions. In these cases, admissibility under the 
Evidence Rule 404(B) is first determined: 
[T]he Wilson and Jackson crimes share a similar 
modus operandi with the murder. In each case, ~~~ 
Waddy entered a woman's apartment at night; he 
bound the victim's wrists behind her back and tied her 
ankles; he used a knife; he called each victim a "bitch"; 
he took the victim's car or car keys; and he stole or de-
manded bank cards or credit cards. The crimes oc-
curred within a three-month period and within walking 
distance of each other. State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d 
424, 429, 588 N.E.2d 819 (1992) (citations omitted), 
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 921 (1992). 
See also State v. Coleman, 37 Ohio St.3d 286, 292, 525 
( J.E.2d 792 (1988) ("[S]imilarities in the crimes indicate 
there is strong likelihood that the offender in the solved 
crime also committed the unsolved crime."), cert. denied, 
488 u.s. 900 (1988). 
MOTION TO SEVER 
An appreciation of the relationship between Rules 8 and 
14 is fundamental to an understanding of joinder and sever-
ance. Severance under Rule 14 requires a showing of prej-
udice. That provision, however, is operable only in the case 
of a proper joinder under Rule 8. If the joinder is improper 
(misjoinder), then severance is automatic and prejudice 
need not be shown. Leading commentators on the Federal 
Rules agree on this point. Professor Wright has written: 
"[Motions for misjoinder] raise only a question of law. If 
there has been misjoinder, the trial court has no discretion 
to deny the motion, and the appellate court may not consid-
er the failure to do so harmless error." 1 Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure 337 (1969). See also id. at 432 
("Rule 14 comes into play only if the original joinder was 
proper. It permits a severance, despite the propriety of the 
original joinder, if needed to avoid prejudice."). See also 8 
Moore's Federal Practice 8-14 (Cipes ed. 1993) ("[A] plead-
ing which fails to comply with the minimum standards of 
joinder should be treated as conclusively prejudicial. This 
means that where the trial judge determines that offenses or 
defendants have been misjoined, he has no discretion to 
peny relief."); United States v. Piacente, 490 F.2d 661, 665 
(7th Cir. 1973) ("When joinder is improper, severance is the 
appropriate remedy and there is no discretion in the court's 
ruling."). 
This point was ignored in State v. Durham, 49 Ohio 
App.2d 231, 233, 360 N.E.2d 743 (1976), in which the court 
stated: 'Where an indictment charges two or more distinct 
offenses, even if improperly joined, the exercise of authority 
to compel the prosecutor to make an election [or grant a 
severance] rests in the sound discretion of the court, to be 
exercised in the promotion of justice and upon good cause 
shown." This passage is dictum because the two counts in 
Durham- aggravated burglary and theft - were properly 
joined under Rule 8(A) since both offenses were "based on 
the same act or transactions." Durham illustrates the ne-
cessity for counsel to inform the court of the precise basis 
for a motion to sever. If there is a misjoinder of offenses, a 
motion to sever should specify that Rule 8, rather than Rule 
14, is the basis of the motion. Otherwise, counsel may be 
required to establish prejudice as specified in Rule 14. 
Motions for severance based on misjoinder are made 
pursuant to Rule 12(B)(2); motions for severance based on 
prejudicial joinder are made pursuant to Rule 12(B)(5). 
Both motions, however, must be made before trial. Motions 
not made prior to trial are waived under Rule 12(G). 
Renewal at Trial 
It is critical, however, that a motion, when denied, be re-
hewed at trial to preserve the right to appeal. For example, 
in State v. Owens, 51 Ohio App.2d 132, 146, 366 N.E.2d 
1367 (1975), the defendant appealed the denial of his pretri-
al motion to sever, but the motion "was not renewed either 
after the state rested or at the conclusion of all of the evi-
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dence. When not renewed, it is waived." This statement is 
troublesome for several reasons. Fir'st, the Owens court 
cited federal authorities to support its position. Its citations, 
however, were selective. The federal courts have not fol-
lowed a uniform rule on the waiver issue. Indeed, the 
United States Supreme Court in Shaffer v. United States, 
362 U.S. 511, 516 (1960), spoke of the trial judge's "continu-
ing duty at all stages of the trial to grant a severance if prej-
udice does appear." Second, Rule 12(B)(5) requires sever-
ance motions under Rule 14 to be made prior to trial. 
Motions not made prior to trial are waived. Therefore, the 
waiver issue is explicitly covered in the Rules, and the 
Rules do not require that the motion be renewed during trial. 
Nevertheless, a prudent attorney should renew the motion 
to avoid any problem. 
Proof in Support of Motion 
When making a motion to sever, counsel should specify 
the grounds on which the motion is based and introduce ev-
idence or make an offer of proof in support of the motion. A 
mere allegation of prejudice will not suffice. Two pre-Rules 
cases addressed this issue. In State v. Perod, 15 Ohio 
App.2d 115, 122, 239 N.E.2d 100 (1968), the court over-
ruled a motion to sever, stating: "The record shows a re-
quest by motion for a separate trial but a total failure to 
show cause." In State v. Fields, 29 Ohio App.2d 154, 158, 
279 N.E.2d 616 (1971 ), the court adopted a somewhat dif-
ferent position. According to that court, good cause may be 
shown "in any manner consistent with proof of motions gen-
erally, including a showing by the professional statement of 
counsel." 
Appeals 
If the defendant has preserved the right to appeal by re-
newing the motion for severance or election at trial, the 
proper means of raising the issue after trial is on appeal and 
not in habeas corpus. Braxton v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 
134, 136; 205 N£.2d 397 (1965). 
DUPLICITY 
Criminal Rule 8(A) prohibits the misjoinder of offenses 
-the unauthorized charging of unrelated offenses in an in-
dictment. Joinder also encompasses the more difficult 
problem of duplicity - alleging more than one distinct of-
fense within a single count of an indictment or complaint. 
"The test of duplicity is whether proof of one [offense] would 
tend to establish guilt of the other." State v. Peters, 112 
Ohio St.249, 260, 147 N.E. 81 (1924). But, duplicity is not 
fatal to an indictment. Rather than dismiss the indictment, 
the court should order that the duplicitous counts be sepa-
rated. 
Alternate Means 
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that it is not duplici-
tous to charge in a single count alternative methods of com-
mitting a crime. In State v. Daniels, 169 Ohio St. 87, 157 
N.E.2d 736 (1959), the defendant was charged with rape 
under a statute that defined rape of either a daughter or sis-
ter, or a child under twelve. The indictment charged rape of 
a daughter and, alternatively, rape of a child under twelve. 
The Court found no repugnancy between these charges be-
cause finding one did not necessarily preclude finding the 
other: "This court has recognized that, where a single of-
fense may be committed in any one of two or more different 
ways, a count is not duplicitous which charges the commis-
sion of the offense conjunctively in two ways, provided there 
is no repugnancy between the ways charged.". ld. at 1 03 (cit-
ing Hah:tv._State, 58 Ohio St. 676,~5_1_N.E. 154 (1898)). 
Similarly, an indictment or count may contain specifications 
that do not necessarily lead to a single theory or motive. In 
State v. Hancock, 48 Ohio St.2d 147, 149, 358 N.E.2d 273 
(1976), vacated in part, 438 U.S. 911 (1978), the Supreme 
Court construed an indictment charging the defendant with 
aggravated murder in which the three specifications present-
ed differing theories - murder to escape detection, murder 
as part of a purposeful course of conduct, and murder while 
fleeing an aggravated robbery. In upholding the indictment, 
the Court was "not persuaded that three specifications of ag-
gravation must be mutually exclusive. A consistent theory of 
an offense can encompass mixed motives." 
AlliED OFFENSES OF SIMILAR IMPORT 
R.C. 294 i .25 provides that where the offenses with which 
the defendant is charged are allied offenses of similar import, 
"the indictment or information may contain counts for all such 
offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one." 
Ohio law allows the state to charge a defendant with two al-
lied offenses, but convict on only one. The prosecution may 
introduce evidence as to both offenses and is not required to 
elect one of the two and to proceed to trial only on that 
charge. State v. Ryan, 17 Ohio App.3d 150, 478 N.E.2d 257 
(1984). 
Conve~sely, if the acts constitute offenses of dissimilar im-
port or result in the same or similar offenses committed at dif-
ferent times or with separate animus, the defendant may be 
tried and convicted on each count. The statute is meant to 
prevent "shotgun" charges. The difficulty in applying the pro-
. , . vision lies in construing the phrase "allied offenses of similar 
' import." 
In State v. Brown, 7 OhioApp.3d 113, 117,454 N.E.2d 596 
(1982), the court of appeals stated the test as follows: if "(1) 
the state relies upon the same conduct to support both offens-
es, (2) ... the offenses and their elements correspond to 
such a degree that commission of one of the offenses ... will 
result in commission of the other, ... and (3) ... the commis-
sion of both offenses was motivated by the same purpose," 
the offenses are allied offenses of similar import. According 
to the court, if the acts complained of are allied offenses of 
similar import, the defendant may still be convicted of both if 
the offenses were "committed separately or with a separate 
animus as to each." ld. at 116. 
In Brown, the defendant burned an infant for whom he was 
babysitting. The infant later died of the burns, and subse-
quently the defendant was convicted and sentenced under 
both the child endangering statute and the involuntary 
manslaughter statute. The court concluded that proof of the 
greater offense required proof of the lesser, and thus the state 
relied on the same conduct to prove both offenses. There 
was no evidence of a separate purpose as to each offense. 
Therefore, the defendant had been improperly convicted of al-
lied offenses of similar import. 
MULTIPLICITY & DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
Multiplicity is the opposite of duplicity; it is the charging of a 
single crime in multiple counts. Rule 8(A) specifically pre-
cludes multiplicity (where the offense is stated in several 
counts of the indictment). Several courts have held that multi-
plicious charges may raise double jeopardy issues. For ex-
ample, in State v. Stratton, 5 Ohio App.3d 228, 230, 451 
N.E.2d 520 (1982), the court of appeals wrote: "If an indict-
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ment suffers from multiplicity and the counts are tried sepa-
rately, then double jeopardy bars subsequent prosecution." 
Stratton was charged with possession of drugs in incidents 
that took place simultaneously and involved the same statuto-
ry provision. The state sought to convict the defendant sepa-
rately for each of the three types of drugs possessed. The 
court examined the statute to determine whether the legisla-
ture intended possession of each substance to constitute a 
separate offense and, after noting that "doubts must be re-
solved in favor of the defendant," held that ''the simultaneous 
possession of several controlled substances constitutes a sin-
gle offense." State v. Stratton, 5 Ohio App.3d 228, 232 451 
N.E.2d 520 (1982). 
The rule against seriatim trials on a multiplicity of charges 
also applies when the charges are brought in different coun-
ties. In State v. Urvan, 4 Ohio App.3d 151, 446 N.E.2d 1161 
(1982), the defendant was charged in Medina County with re-
ceiving stolen property and, based on the same course of 
conduct, later charged in Cuyahoga County with grand theft. 
The defendant was admitted to a pretrial diversion program in 
Medina County under a contract embracing both charges, but 
only the Medina County charge was nailed following his suc-
cessful completion of the program. The court of appeals held 
that bringing the defendant to trial on the Cuyahoga County 
charge would amount to double jeopardy. Both charges could 
have been brought in either county under the venue statute, 
R.C. 2901.12, but the state could not split venue in order to 
bring successive prosecutions because such a practice ex-
emplifies the hazard the Double Jeopardy Clause was de-
signed to prevent. Jeopardy in this case attached upon de-
fendant's successful completion of the pretrial diversion pro-
gram, which must be considered the equivalent of served 
time or completed probation. 
[l]f the program is to make logical sense and traffic at all 
in fair treatment, the state's election to pursue the crime 
of stolen property forecloses its right to undertake pur-
suit of the grand theft charge through a second agent .. 
.. Jeopardy must attach as a result of the activity of the 
first [agent]. ld. at 156. 
Collateral Estoppel 
In addition, although Ohio law does not mandate that re-
lated offenses be joined, the United States Supreme Court 
has included the doctrine of collateral estoppel within the pro-
tection of double jeopardy, and a failure to join some related 
offenses in one trial may preclude the state from subsequent 
prosecutions. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444-45 
(1970), the Court defined collateral estoppel as occurring 
when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined in 
the defendant's favor by a valid and finEJ.I judgment. "Where 
a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general 
verdict, ... this approach requires a court to examine the 
record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the plead-
ings, evidence, charges, and other relevant matters, and 
conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its ver-
dict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks 
to foreclose from consideration." Ashe was charged with six 
separate counts of armed robbery and was tried on one 
count and acquitted, the identity of the defendant being the ·~ 
single issue in dispute. Collateral estoppel precluded the 
subsequent prosecution of the defendant for another count of 
armed robbery. 
